Russian vs. Chinese Foreign Influence Campaigns: Different Approaches to Information Manipulation

Russian vs. Chinese foreign Influence Campaigns: Different Approaches to Information Manipulation

According to the European External Action Service's (EEAS) recent report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), significant differences exist between Russian and Chinese methods of conducting influence operations.

Key Differences Between Russian and Chinese Influence Approaches:

• Operational Structure:

  • Russia operates primarily from within state-controlled entities and direct governmental channels.

  • China often leverages external suppliers, including legitimate public relations firms and social media influencers, to indirectly disseminate its messaging.
    

• Approach to Dialogue:

  • Russia tends to poison dialogue by promoting polarizing content and disinformation that exacerbates internal conflicts and tensions.

  • China focuses more on suppressing critical voices through targeted censorship rather than directly fueling discord.

    
    

• Message Localization:

  • Russia deploys region-specific, tailored messages designed to resonate with local political, cultural, and social contexts.

  • China emphasizes centralized messaging, delivering uniform narratives consistently across different regions.

    
    

• Narrative Objectives:

  • Both Russia and China frequently emphasize Western culpability in the Ukraine conflict.

  • China prioritizes promoting its own international image and positive narratives about itself, rather than explicitly creating internal discord within other countries.

  
  

• Strategic Cooperation:

  • Although occasionally aligning narratives opportunistically, Russia and China do not engage in extensive strategic cooperation. Their alignment on certain issues, like blaming NATO for the Ukraine war, appears primarily opportunistic rather than systematically coordinated.

    
    

This differentiation in tactics underscores the complex landscape of modern information warfare, requiring nuanced and tailored responses to effectively counter these distinct types of influence operations.

Notable Examples of Influence Campaigns from the study:

• Russian Campaigns:

  • European Elections 2024: Russia targeted EU voters with disinformation aimed at undermining support for Ukraine and spreading false narratives about corruption among European leaders.
    

  • Moldova and Georgia Elections 2024: Russia attempted interference using covert funding, paid influencers, and targeted social media campaigns to disrupt democratic processes and amplify division.
    

• Chinese Campaigns:

  • HaiEnergy and Paperwall: Major influence-for-hire operations involving hundreds of fabricated websites managed by Chinese PR firms to covertly spread pro-Beijing content globally
    

  • Taiwan and US Elections 2024: China targeted these elections through systematic use of PR firms and influencers to indirectly propagate state narratives, alongside direct suppression of opposing viewpoints.

Source: EEAS, "3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats," March 2025.